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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last five decades, development assistance has evolved dramatically in response 
to an equally mutable global political and economic landscape. In this paper, we examine 
this evolution and discuss how the effectiveness of aid has been and will be seen in the 
eyes of donors, intended beneficiaries, and outside observers. From an historical 
perspective, we note that the effectiveness debate has been confined by preoccupation 
with macro institutions and outcomes. We also discuss how the relative importance of aid 
has changed with the rapid growth of trade and private capital markets. Looking ahead, 
we argue that great care should be taken when applying macro performance evaluation to 
development assistance. This approach increases the risk that aid will be politicized and 
allocated inefficiently. Rationing credit in whatever form it takes by macro-criteria 
inevitably screens out credit- or need-worthy recipients, while many beneficiaries in 
attractive macro settings may be less deserving. Simplistic macro rules-of-thumb not only 
compromise more rigorous credit and need standards; they reinforce the adversity of 
people living under substandard governance. In reality, aid and lending relationships 
involve complex contractual and agency relationships that are essentially microeconomic 
in nature. We therefore discuss how conceptual innovations in modern economic theory 
might be enlisted to improve aid effectiveness. In passing, we also review some 
implications for public donor institutions of another globalization phenomenon, rapidly 
emergent private policy agencies in the form of NGOs. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Foreign aid has undergone many fundamental shifts since the middle of the last 
century. During the 1960s and 1970s, a multilateral agenda of development goals, 
institutions and procedures was added to traditional bilateralism. Thinking about 
development policy was drastically modified from the early 1980s onwards; and the 
evolving donor-recipient relationship today can best be described as deeply uncertain and 
circumspect. In parallel, the global economic context in which foreign aid is implemented 
has been transformed in ways unimagined at the time of Bretton Woods. 
Emerging from debates about the ‘micro-macro’ paradox from the 1980s, the 
analysis of aid effectiveness became dominated by macro-econometric approaches during 
the 1990s. Convincing evidence emerged that aid works at both the macro and micro 
level, but the putative lessons learned from this vary greatly, and disagreements persist 
about both necessary and sufficient conditions for effective economic aid. This is so both 
with refeernce to more narrow debates about appropriate economic policy and to the 
wider institutional context within which aid is implemented. The donor-driven nature of 
many aid programs has since the mid-1990s led to repeated calls for a change in the 
balance in donor-recipient relations and the need for a new kind of partnership.1 One 
response has been the increased use of the concept of ‘ownerhip’ in the aid rhetoric, but 
what this means in theory and practice is less clear. 
After an historical survey in Section 2 of the aid effectiveness literature, we 
provide in Section 3 a brief empirical narrative on the changing relative importance of aid 
in the present era of globalization. Rapid and sustained growth of trade and international 
capital flows have essential implications for both the appropriate role and the 
effectiveness of development assistance, and historical trends indicate that aid should best 
be focused on its core mission of assisting the most disadvantaged and helping to correct 
those market failures that most critically affect basic human needs such as public health, 
subsistence, and livelihood. Beginning from this more restrictive context, there are still 
                                                 
1 See Helleiner (2000). 
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many areas for broadening and deepening the commitment to development priorities. 
With the diminution of aid’s relative size in the multilateral economic environment, we 
see ourselves entering an Age of Complementarity, where private sector interests can and 
must be leveraged by donor institutions in pursuit of more socially beneficial policy 
objectives. 
As an attempt at contributing to the reshaping of existing perspectives on 
development assistance, the fourth section of this paper puts forward a series of ten 
hypothetical percepts, or operational principles, for guiding more effective aid 
relationships in the future. In particular, we argue that great care should be taken when 
applying macroeconomic or (worse) macro-political performance evaluation to 
development assistance. These approaches increase the risk that aid will be allocated in 
both economically and socially inefficient ways. Rationing credit by macro-criteria 
inevitably screens out credit- or need-worthy recipients, while many beneficiaries in 
attractive macro settings may be less deserving. Simplistic macro rules-of-thumb not only 
compromise more rigorous credit and need standards; they reinforce the adversity of 
those living under substandard governance. In reality, aid and lending relationships 
involve complex contractual and agency relationships that are essentially microeconomic 
in nature. This is so both at the level of national donor-recipient interaction and when 
microeconomic actors are in focus. We suggest that real ownership will remain elusive 
unless this is recognized throughout; and in this paper, we start discussing how 
conceptual innovations in modern economic theory might be enlisted to overcome 
imperfections in the underlying microeconomics of aid relationships, thereby improving 
aid effectiveness.  
A fifth section of the paper briefly reviews an important institutional phenomenon 
associated with globalization, the rapid emergence of Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) and the implications of this emergence for the pursuit of effective development 
assistance. While this discussion is only relevant to a subset of NGOs, these institutions 
have arisen to meet a manifest desire on the part of (mainly OECD) higher income 
individuals to participate in the design and conduct of global development assistance. 
Seen in this way, the NGO movement is a force and not only must – but should – be more 
constructively reckoned with by established bilateral and multilateral aid institutions. 
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Again the issue for the latter group is complementarities, how best to leverage the 
intentions and energies in pursuit of bona fide development objectives. To do this, and 
especially to do it with a minimum of politicization, is a great challenge, but it is one that 
must be met if the full promise of North-South cooperation is ever to be realized. 
 
2 Retrospective2 
 
Economic development since the middle of the last century has been spectacular. 
There are many encouraging examples of development successes. There is also evidence 
of a widening gap between the most and the least successful. Too many countries lag 
behind, particularly in Africa, and around 1.2 billion people have to manage their lives 
with an income of less than a dollar a day. Political leaders have over and over again 
asserted that widespread poverty and existing imbalances in socio-economic conditions 
are unacceptable and should be corrected through urgent and concerted action. Yet, 
foreign aid is under pressure and its usefulness was widely questioned during the 1990s. 
The roots of foreign aid can be traced back to at least the 19th century, but the 
economic and social development of the third world, as such, was clearly not a policy 
objective of the colonial rulers before the Second World War. Such an objective would – 
as argued by Erik Thorbecke – have been inconsistent with the underlying division of 
labor and trading patterns within and among colonial blocks. Thorbecke goes on to 
outline how the concept of foreign aid as a contributing factor to development evolved 
within the broader framework of development theory and strategy during the last five 
decades of the 20th century. He highlights that while recognizing the role that non-
developmental goals play in the allocation of aid, it would be overly cynical to dismiss 
the developmental benefits of aid – whether they resulted directly from the 
developmental motivation by donors or indirectly, as a side-effect of politically motivated 
resource transfers. 
                                                 
2 In what follows we draw upon many of the papers published in Tarp (2000). This volume synthesized 
contributions from some 29 authors who are cited in what follows by name only. 
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In the immediate post-war period, the problem in Europe was lack of capital. The 
response was the Marshall plan, implemented from 1948 to 1953 and driven in part by 
fear of communism and the desire of the USA to secure American hegemony in global 
trade and investment. The plan was massive even by today’s standards. It was also very 
effective. It helped diminish the acute scarcity of foreign exchange in Europe, and it gave 
rise to many of the elements of the existing system of aid delivery. However, the needs of 
the developing areas of the world per se were not yet in focus. The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), established at the Bretton Woods Conference 
in 1944, was originally concerned with reconstruction elsewhere, and the International 
Development Association (IDA) was only created in 1960 to channel resources to the 
poorest countries on ‘soft’ conditions. Developing regions did receive support from the 
colonial powers before 1960, notably from Britain and France, and the volume of French 
aid as a share of GNP actually increased to more than 1% by the early 1960s. A major 
part of the rapidly increasing bilateral flows during the 1950s came from the USA, whose 
aid/GNP share grew to well above 0.5%; but considerable continuity from colonial to 
post-colonial institutions was characteristic, as described by Peter Hjertholm and Howard 
White. Colonial ties were strong and influential. 
After the success of the Marshall Plan, attention increasingly turned to developing 
countries, many of which became independent around 1960. Hjertholm and White note 
that this created a constituency for aid, and they go on to explain that the first meeting of 
the nonaligned movement in 1955 gave a focus to this voice, as did the various organs of 
the UN, notably the United Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The 
evolution from symbiotic to inward looking growth and from dependent to a somewhat 
more independent relation, vis-à-vis the ex-colonial powers, was beginning to emerge as 
noted by Thorbecke. In parallel, the 1960s saw a distinct increase in the share of 
multilateral aid; and the role of aid started shifting towards a broader agenda of socio-
economic goals that clearly went beyond the exclusive focus on promoting economic 
growth, characteristic of the 1950s. The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) came 
into being in 1958, and as the first of the three regional development banks, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) was established in 1959. The multilateralism of aid 
became even more pronounced in the 1970s, which saw an increased focus on 
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employment, income distribution and poverty alleviation as essential objectives of 
development and indeed aid.  
Economic progress was visible during much of the third world during the first two 
decades from 1960. Irma Adelman refers to this as the golden age of economic growth, 
but this era came to an abrupt end when crisis set in at the beginning of the 1980s. It soon 
became evident that the downturn was of a more permanent nature, not temporary as in 
1973; and it was gradually recognized that the development strategies of the previous 
decades were no longer sustainable. Economic circumstances in developing countries and 
the relations between North and South were radically different from before, so 
adjustments had to be made in economic policies. Achieving macro-economic balance 
(externally and internally) appeared as essential pre-requisites for renewed development; 
and macroeconomic stabilization and adjustment became important and in much of the 
rhetoric of the day almost synonymous with economic transformation and development. 
Reliance on market forces, outward orientation and the role of the private sector, 
including NGOs, came into focus, whereas poverty alleviation somehow slipped out of 
view in mainstream approaches to economic reform. 
In parallel, bilateral donors and international agencies such as the World Bank 
grappled with how to channel resources to the developing world. Net aid flows were 
seriously affected by flows related to indebtedness, and by the late 1970s it had become 
increasingly difficult to channel resources in the form of discrete projects to many 
developing countries. The various kinds of macro-economic program assistance (such as 
balance of payments support and sector budget support, which were not tied to 
investment projects, and which could be justified under the headings of stabilization and 
adjustment, appeared an ideal solution to this dilemma. Financial program aid and 
adjustment loans became fashionable and ‘policy conditionality’ widespread. 3 
Maintaining the flow of resources had found a rationale, which corresponded well with 
the major tenets of the on-going ‘neo-classical counter-revolution’ and the guidelines for 
‘good policy’ summarized under the heading of the ‘Washington consensus’. All in all, 
aid continued to grow in real terms until the early 1990s and actually represented a 
                                                 
3 Paul Mosley and Marion Eeckhout describe in detail the movement from project to program assistance 
and Ole Mølgård Andersen provides a sector perspective on these issues. 
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relatively constant share of the growing GNP of the donor community during the period 
1970-1990. This is so even if US assistance started falling already in the mid-1960s as a 
share of GNP to less than 0.2% at the end of the century. However, after 1990, total aid 
flows started to decline both in absolute terms and as a share of GNP.  
There are many reasons for the decline in aggregate flows, including first of all 
the fall of communism and the end of the cold war. Weakening patron-client relations 
among the developing countries and their former colonial masters certainly also played a 
role, and the traditional support of development aid by vocal interest groups in the 
developed countries became eroded. Other concerns, notably the environment, and 
distrust of bilateral and multilateral agencies made an impact. These institutions have 
been subjected to criticism and at times characterized as blunt instruments of commercial 
interests in the developed world or as self-interested, rent-seeking bureaucracies. In any 
case, the widespread perception that aid is at best ineffective in fostering growth at the 
macro level no doubt also had an important role to play. A superficial look at available 
data does indeed seem to suggest that aid is ineffective in promoting growth, and 
anecdotes about failed projects at the micro level contributed to an increasing sense of aid 
fatigue in donor countries. Finally, the acute awareness of examples of bad governance, 
corruption and ‘crony capitalism’ led during the 1990s, in particular, to skepticism about 
the sincerity and credibility of aid receiving governments.  
Raymond Hopkins points out that the use of governments to transfer resources has 
become less legitimate as governments are less trusted (on both the donor and the 
recipient side). A sense of failure certainly spread during the 1990s, and such perceptions 
obviously represent a serious challenge to any economic development rationale for aid. 
To the extent they are correct and nullify the potential impact of aid transfers (in 
whatever form they take), humanitarian aid seems to be the only justifiable road left to 
follow. It is therefore well justified to speculate about and examine the effectiveness of 
aid. After all, while aid has generally fallen in relation to other resource flows (as further 
described in Section 3), aid still represents a sizeable amount of resources, the impact of 
which should be maximized.  
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Foreign aid has throughout its history been subjected to close scrutiny both by 
academic researchers and others interested in the topic. A massive outpour of studies over 
several decades bears witness to this, and it is characteristic that the boundary between 
policy advocacy (one way or the other) and research has not always been clearly 
delineated. Be that as it may, most development economists and aid practitioners have at 
one stage or the other come across the so-called ‘micro-macro’ paradox, formulated by 
Mosley (1987). This thesis suggested that while aid seems effective at the micro-level, it 
is harder – or actually impossible – to identify any positive impact of aid on the macro-
economy. Much of this was spurred by the focus of the 1980s in uncovering the impact of 
the stabilization and structural adjustment packages. As a corollary of the adjustment 
programs in many countries, the use of a wider variety of analytical tools in aid impact 
assessment became common. Evaluation methods such as the internal rate of return of 
projects came under severe criticism as the perception that aid (channeled through 
sovereign governments) is fully fungible spread. In parallel, the difficulties of 
macroeconomic evaluation summarized under headings such as ‘before-and-after’ and 
‘with-and-without’ were the topic for many discussions, and methodological issues 
gradually came to play an important role in the aid effectiveness debate. 
In spite of all this, aid fatigue lingered on. The strong faith in the operation of 
markets and skepticism regarding governments, including both recipients and donors, 
were formidable barriers. After all, foreign aid has to a large extent always been a state-
to-state relationship. Fatigue was also influenced by the fear that foreign aid was 
generating aid dependency relationships and as such would have negative incentive 
effects. The increasing perception that ‘conditionality’ was in effect failing to promote 
policy reform started to creep in at the turn of the century, and it became clear that the 
relationship between donors-and-recipients left much to be desired. Ravi Kanbur argues 
that the accounts of failure are legion, and he has provided a fascinating summary of both 
the background and the present state of affairs. He notes that while there is reason to view 
the donor-recipient relationship as one of unequal power, imposing conditionality is in 
practice much more subtle. In fact, there is strength in the weakness of the recipients, and 
above all, weakness in the strength of the donors. The basic reason is, Kanbur argues, that 
donors and recipients are so enmeshed, at the level of governments, agencies and 
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individuals, that it is actually not clear where the strengths and weaknesses lie. 
Conditionality was no doubt ‘imposed’ on unwilling recipients at the time of signing 
adjustment documents, but ‘the recipients know, the donors know, and in fact everybody 
knows, that these are paper conditions; the outcome will be driven by the need of both 
sides to maintain normal relations and the flow of aid’. 
All of this motivated a renewed interest in coming to grips with the need for nerw 
kinds of donor-recipient relationships and with the effectiveness of aid. In response, calls 
were made for increased national ownership of aid programs, and both World Bank 
researchers and others started digging into the aid-growth relationship. This was 
facilitated in part by the availability of much better data and in part by insights emerging 
from new growth theory and the rapidly increasing number of empirical studies of 
growth. Early work in this vein by Boone (1996) suggested that aid does not work. Aid is 
a simple waste of resources. This was followed-up with an analysis by Burnside and 
Dollar (1997, 2000), originally put out as a World Bank policy research working paper.4 
They argue that some aid does work, and provided an attractive and seemingly self-
evident solution to the ‘micro-macro’ paradox. Aid works, but only in countries with so-
called ‘good policy’. They based this on an aid-policy interaction term that came out 
statistically significant in their macro-econometric analyses of the aid-growth 
relationship. 
Burnside and Dollar, and more recently also for example Collier (2002), have 
used the above framework as basis for suggesting that aid should be directed to ‘good 
policy’ countries to maximize aid’s impact on poverty alleviation. This is in part justified 
by reference to the seeming inability of aid to change policy, emerging from other Bank 
funded research, edited by Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren (2001).5 While the policy 
recommendations were considerably toned down in the Bank’s Monterrey document 
(World Bank 2002), the basic thrust somehow remains. Macroeconomic performance 
evaluation and policy criteria (established by the World Bank) should play a key role in 
aid allocation. Collier refers to this as aid effectiveness – 101. In parallel, the World Bank 
                                                 
4 The Burnside-Dollar study formed the analytical core of the World Bank (1998) study entitled Assessing 
Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why. 
5 See Tarp (2001) for a comprehensive book review. 
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President has on many occasions asserted that a development program must be country-
owned, not owned by donors or the World Bank. 
The Burnside-Dollar and Collier work has not gone unchallenged. Heated 
discussions about what constitutes ‘good policy’ have taken place. They are in many 
ways extensions of more general debates and views about development strategy and 
policy, and it is characteristic that the concept of ‘good policy’ has been gradually 
expanded by the World Bank to include a much wider and much more complex set of 
characteristics than originally considered. Other discussions have centered around what 
can be learned from the kind of cross-country growth regressions that underlie much of 
the recent empirical work on aid effectiveness. Reflections such as those of Robert Solow 
(2001) can be referred to.6 Solow suggests, for example, that there is a case for focusing 
more directly on TFP or factor augmentation functions as the proper left-hand-side 
variables in empirical work and thinking more seriously about legitimate right hand side 
variables. Current practice is in his view much too haphazard. Academic debate on aid 
effectiveness has finally covered new and important territory when it comes to issues of 
empirical methodology and interpretation, and it has been reiterated that robustness is an 
issue that should not be taken lightly when research is used for formulating policy. 
There are many thought provoking contributions to this debate, which cannot for 
reasons of space be reviewed here. 7  Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2002) offer new 
theoretical and empirical insights and provide an up-to-date account. They note that the 
single most common result in recent empirical studies is that aid has a positive impact on 
real GDP per capita growth, but displays diminishing returns. They go on to conclude 
that the recent empirical evidence that aid works is convincing, and that political 
decisions on curbing aid cannot be justified, arguing that aid has no impact on growth. 
This is encouraging, and it suggests that it is now time to move on to consider how the 
                                                 
6 The Solow paper appears in a special volume of the World Bank Economic Review August 2001, Vol. 15 
(2), which also contains a series of other interesting papers on empirical growth research. 
7 See for example Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) and a special ‘Policy Forum on Assessing Aid’ (organized 
by Oliver Morrissey) in the Journal of International Development (Vol. 12, No. 3). Interested readers 
may also want to examine the August 2001 (Vol. 37, No. 6) special issue of the Journal of Development 
Studies with contributions by many authorities in this area. Draft versions of many of these contributions 
were originally put out as University of Nottingham CREDIT working papers at the following web-site: 
www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/research/credit. A recent paper by Mosley and Hudson (2001) looks 
at the impact on aid on poverty rather than on growth in per capital income. 
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effectiveness of aid can and should be improved – rather than focusing on whether aid 
works. In trying to move forward, it is hard not to be struck by fact that the putative 
lessons learned from the past 5-10 years vary greatly. Disagreements persist about 
necessary and sufficient conditions for effective economic aid. What we have learned 
about what aid can do, what aid should do, and how to do it remains clouded; and the 
gaop betwen rhetoric and practice when it comes to aid relations continues to be a matter 
of concern for many independent observers and analysts.8  
In sum, while the last 50 years of the 20th century saw a move away from colonial 
to post-colonial aid and increasing multilateralism, the early 21st century is best 
characterized as an era of uncertainty. The evolving donor-recipient relationships are 
unclear and circumspect. In his reflections on this, Hopkins lists a variety of possible 
motivations for sustaining aid in the future, and he identifies three targets that may be 
useful to keep in mind as having wide appeal among diverse elements in the donor and 
recipient communities. They include: (i) state strengthening, (ii) improved market 
management, and (iii) emergency safety nets. Hopkins recommends these targets as 
problems for promoting future aid. There are by now several such lists in existence, and 
they certainly do signal the need to try to work out more clearly what roles aid should 
assume in the future in the emerging context of globalization and market-oriented 
growth. 
 
3 Aid and Globalization 
 
Over the period discussed in the previous section, the world economy has 
changed in ways that every educated person knows are unprecedented and irreversible. 
Most notable in the present context is the rapid proliferation of international trade 
relations that have been built upon a stratum of open multilateralism. Regional and global 
agreements to liberalize international commerce have changed the landscape of 
economics and nearly every agenda for economic policy in ways that are pervasive and 
                                                 
8 In discussing present aid modalities, Helleiner (2000) notes that there “is still a curious “disconnect” 
between donors’ general rhetoric on these issues and actual practice on the ground’. 
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still only partially understood. In the present context, it is reasonable to ask: How can the 
mission of aid best be pursued in an era of globalization? Without offering any definitive 
answers, this section provides a brief historical narrative to elucidate this question. 
The growth of trade, growth of economies, and their interaction over recent 
decades have filled volumes with statistical tables, policy analysis, and academic 
research. Our purpose here is to focus more narrowly on the components of economic 
change that might be more relevant to aid’s place in the global economy. Even though 
there has been much work on this topic, we believe that a new perspective on the facts 
and prior analysis might be beneficial.  
Consider for example the very animated debate about absolute levels of global 
development assistance. While we believe that greater levels of commitment to the 
world’s poor are necessary to secure sustainable progress for them and for the rich, 
historical data indicate that global aid levels have kept pace with both incomes and 
population in the developing world. Figure 3.1 presents ratios of total aid to Trade, GDP, 
and Population, respectively, of non-OECD countries for the period 1971-1999. Aid, 
Trade, and GDP are measured in constant dollars and the ratios normalized to unity in the 
initial year. 
Figure 3.1: Aid to Trade, GDP, and Population Ratios 
(normalized to unity in 1971) 
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These series show total aid rising steadily in relation to income and population 
until the early 1990s, but stagnating thereafter. While it might seem appealing to some 
that Aid/GDP is now twice what it was in 1971 and Aid/Capita has increased threefold, it 
should be borne in mind that the international composition of these ratios vary 
tremendously between high and low growth economies of the South. Perhaps the most 
revealing aspect here is the complete lack of net progress over the last two decades. The 
reversion to complacency that might be inferred from these numbers is certainly not 
justified by dramatic progress in global poverty alleviation during the late 1990s. 
How does all this relate to globalization? The third series, measuring Aid relative 
to total world exports and imports, reveals the implications of a well-known fact, that 
trade has been growing faster than GDP and, despite a recent upturn, aid flows are about 
the same magnitude relative to trade as they were in the 1970s. Obviously these two 
economic entities have little or no causal relationship, but this trend does indicate that 
flourishing international commerce has not been associated with a boom in charitable 
activity, a linkage that one often observes in domestic economic cycles. Put a little 
differently, the sense of public humanitarian mission that animated development 
assistance programs in the early decades has not been sustained by the dramatic growth 
of private sector commercial interest in the international economy.  
Although trade can facilitate poverty alleviation, it operates in very different 
ways, and with a different mission, than aid. The primary impetus of aid is real and social 
investment, and its putative mission can generally be characterized as an effort to 
facilitate better human living standards by direct transfers, investments, and overcoming 
institutional and market failures. From this perspective, aid more closely resembles 
activities on the capital account, including one dramatically emergent phenomenon, 
foreign direct investment (FDI). While FDI is a private sector activity, and thus is 
animated by very different primary objectives, it has been known to confer many benefits 
on developing economies that are consistent with aid objectives, including human 
resource development, technology diffusion, and, ultimately, poverty alleviation and 
more sustainable growth. In this sense, it has long been recognized that there may be 
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essential complementarities between private and public foreign investment in developing 
countries, where the latter means aid.  
The extent to which the complementarities matter is of course dependent upon 
their potential and real significance. To get an idea of the former, look at the trends 
presented in Figure 3.2 below. These depict, for non-OECD countries, levels of GDP, 
Trade, Aid, and inbound FDI for the period 1971-1999, normalized from constant US 
dollars to unity in 1971. The most arresting feature of this data is of course the meteoric 
rise in inbound FDI, which has increased almost exactly one hundredfold over the last 
three decades.9 This trend must inspire reflection on the appropriate strategy to public 
foreign investment, or development assistance, going forward.  
 
Figure 3.2: Macroeconomic Trends for NonOECD Economies 
(normalized from constant USD to unity in 1971) 
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To depict this issue in even higher relief, Figure 3.3 presents ratios of aid to non-
OECD inbound FDI, accompanied by the aid to trade ratio of Figure 3.1. The series of 
Aid/FDI depicts the ratio of absolute (constant USD) levels for each year. In relative 
                                                 
9 Needless to say, this distribution of these private capital inflows has been very unequal across the 
developing countries. 
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dollar terms, private capital inflows were about four times the level of development 
assistance by 1999, and forward commitments by both public and private interests imply 
that this disparity can only widen. That being the case, we believe we have already 
entered what might be termed the Age of Complementarity in development assistance. 
This is a new era where aid strategies must be focused upon their core missions, paring 
away many components of the grander aid agendas of the 1960s and 1970s. At the same 
time, aid institutions must allocate new resources to more strategic partnership that can 
leverage a significant component of private financial resources to further socially 
beneficial objectives in recipient countries.  
 
Figure 3.3: Aid to Trade and Inbound FDI Ratios 
(Aid/Trade normalized to unity in 1971, Aid/FDI ratio of constant USD levels) 
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We believe that perspectives on aid must change in two ways to deal with this 
situation. First, there must be broader and more refined awareness of the implications of 
coexistence between public and private investment in developing countries. Several 
topics related to this will be covered in the next section, but of particular importance will 
be a better understanding of the primary behavioral drivers and mechanisms behind 
private investment, particularly ownership and contracts. Institutions like the World Bank 
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have as already noted drawn increased public attention to the concept of ownership, but 
the real microeconomics of property rights and entitlement, as these are implicated in the 
marketplace, is more complicated than rhetoric about stake holding and community 
participation.  
A second priority for more effective aid complementarity would be official 
multilateral initiatives to improve public/private communication on development 
priorities. Obviously, institutions like the IMF and others have been contending with this 
‘partnership’ for a long time, but it is not clear the more traditional bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies have awakened to the realities of aid and globalization or made 
the strategic adjustments necessary to more fully exploit complementarities with private 
capital markets. Indeed, official international coordination of public aid alone is still a 
significant challenge. Public-private coordination has until now remained primarily a 
domestic policy matter, with trade and commerce ministries simply working to promote 
market access abroad. 
Detailed examples of how this strategy might develop are too numerous for the 
present discussion, but two might be illustrative. Consider one of the primary missions of 
development assistance in its earliest days, to provide liquidity for public investment in 
the absence of well-developed international capital markets. Obviously, the issue of 
capital market failure is very different today, but it has not disappeared. While investment 
resources are available today for an enormous spectrum of investment activities in the 
developing world, there are still areas where the public must take initiative. These are the 
traditional social investment and long term infrastructure projects like public health in 
rural areas, but they remain essential to the most economically disadvantaged. This is 
what we mean by refocusing on the core mission of assistance. 
At the other extreme, we see private entities stampeding into infrastructure 
investments like media, telecoms, and energy. In situations like this, private markets 
appear to be delivering technological progress to developing countries rapidly and 
efficiently, and one might reasonably question the need for public assistance. To do this 
is to underestimate the potential of complementarity. In the case of media, example, 
OECD countries have long histories of regulatory evolution that can be conferred to 
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developing countries, helping them to better use the resources of private sector 
development for socially beneficial ends. In this way, bilaterals and multilaterals can 
have an essential influence on the quality, if not the quantity, of inbound investment and 
its ultimate social impact. The same logic applies to public and private health, 
pharmaceuticals, food safety, etc.  
 
4 Ten Percepts for Aid Effectiveness 
 
From the discussion of the last two sections, it is clear that the role of aid has 
evolved rapidly in recent years, in response to a combination of political and economic 
forces. Although aid no longer serves the same objectives or enjoys the prominence it 
once did, it can still be a potent catalyst for poverty alleviation around the world. John 
Healey and Tony Killick argue that aid can be used to reduce poverty, and we agree. In 
fact, poverty is very much a micro-economic phenomenon, and while growth should be 
promoted, it is seldom enough to cure poverty. Similarly, aid can be used to promote 
integration in global markets as discussed by Oliver Morrisey. Yet, given its diminished 
political and economic significance on a global scale, the effectiveness of aid design and 
implementation is more important than ever. In this section, we survey ten areas where 
more insight can be gained. While these topics only cover a subset of the issues relevant 
to aid effectiveness, we hope they will offer fresh perspectives to renew the energies of 
those who want aid to work better for all its direct and indirect beneficiaries. 
 
Macro and General Equilibrium Perspectives 
We begin by looking at aid issues from an economy-wide perspective. This 
includes traditional macroeconomic topics and performance criteria and those related to 
general equilibrium linkages transmitting effects between actors in the economy. The 
former, reviewed by Hansen and Tarp (2000), have received much attention in the aid 
effectiveness literature over the five past decades, while the latter is often relegated to 
academic research and absent from policy dialogue. 
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4.1 Macro criteria, misallocation, and rationing 
Macro performance generally, and aggregate real income growth in particular, are 
certainly high priorities for development policy. Yet, we are convinced that macro criteria 
cannot – and should not – stand alone in evaluating the effectiveness of most 
development assistance efforts. Whether or not, and under whatever circumstances, 
macroeconomic growth and poverty alleviation might be correlated; poverty is a 
microeconomic phenomenon and needs to be addressed as such with a significant 
component of development assistance. More importantly, macro characteristics can be 
dangerously misleading as criteria for aid allocation. With the exception of short-term 
macroeconomic assistance, using macro criteria for aid eligibility is likely to lead to 
serious misallocation. Ultimately, the target beneficiaries of aid intended for poverty 
alleviation are microeconomic institutions: small enterprises, households, and 
individuals. Their credit-worthiness and need-worthiness cannot be effectively assessed 
with macroeconomic metrics, let alone with heuristic and quasi-political rules-of-thumb 
like ‘good’ or ‘bad policies.’ In countries with poor macro conditions, including adverse 
business cycles and weak or compromised policy institutions, many credit- and need-
worthy candidates would be ineligible for credit they might use effectively. 10 At the same 
time, a macro bias in favor of other countries would lead to substandard credit allocation 
at the micro level. In other words, rationing credit by macro-criteria inevitably screens 
out credit- or need-worthy recipients, while many beneficiaries in attractive macro 
settings may be less deserving. 
It is clear from the literature on aid effectiveness, as well as the institutions 
supporting much of this research, that a macro bias is reinforced by sovereign credit 
relationships. Bilateral and multilateral institutions are generally entering aid 
relationships with national entities, and therein arises the preoccupation with quantitative 
and qualitative macro policy criteria. Our essential argument is that that care should be 
                                                 
10 Another case that comes to mind where there is reason to caution against the over-use of macro criteria 
relates to post-conflict societies. Tony Addison addresses the complex issues related to aid and conflict, 
and one can certainly note that simplistic rules of thumb would rule out aid to post-conflict countries 
such as East Timor and Afghanistan at present; but these are precisely the countries that need better 
macro-policy institutions. 
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taken when applying macroeconomic performance evaluation to development assistance. 
This approach increases the risk that aid will be politicized and allocated inefficiently. 
Assessing economies with generic government policy ratings carries similar 
misallocation risks. Simplistic macro rules-of-thumb not only compromise more rigorous 
credit and need standards, but reinforce the adversity of those living under substandard 
governance. It is a regrettable fact that many of the world’s poorest people live in 
conditions of substandard national, regional, and/or local governance and, unlike their 
enfranchised counterparts in OECD countries, lack any tenable means of changing these 
institutions.11 It would be gravely ironic for aid agencies to compound the misfortunes of 
these people with discriminatory aid allocation.  
Finally, we would argue that the use of the ownership concept is often misplaced 
in the national (government) macro-context. There is of course nothing wrong with 
‘ownership’ per se, on the contrary. But governments have varying degrees of ownership 
over policies and some are not ‘owned’ at all. In fact, many governments do not have a 
single policy line. Different parts of government adhere to different policy lines, 
depending on how close they are to donors and on the preferences of state actors in each 
ministry. What genuine ownership means is therefore not that evident, particularly when 
microeconomic actors are omitted. As we argue later in this section, it is precisely those 
actors whose incentives and interests will determine much of aid’s real effectiveness. 
 
4.2 Foreign exchange risk, local currency credit, and macro moral hazard 
Having argued against excessive reliance on macro criteria for aid appraisal and 
allocation, we want to emphasize what we consider to be the two critically important 
focal points in the context of sustained development assistance (as opposed to short term 
macro stabilization): quality of contracts and microeconomic appraisal. Both these issues 
will be discussed in more detail from a micro perspective below. But the fact of sovereign 
relations makes contract quality just as important at the macro level. Better contracts, 
                                                 
11 Readers, interested in cross-country empirical approaches, may wish to consult Dalgaard, Hansen and 
Tarp (2002) for an elaboration of why the endogeneity of policies and institutions should be taken more 
seriously than in much of the existing analytical work. 
 20
particularly those that capture the realities of incentive problems and principal-agent 
relationships, can improve aid effectiveness at both macro and micro levels. And they can 
potentially help furnish the ownership concept with real meaning. It would also facilitate 
the truly independent monitoring of aid relations advocated by for example Helleiner 
(2000). 
As a macro example, consider the currency of loan denomination. Many critics of 
foreign assistance have argued that dollar or other ‘hard currency’ denominated credit has 
conferred excessive foreign exchange risk upon poor borrowers. Some have even asserted 
that this risk constitutes a de facto subsidy to for example the U.S. as borrowers are 
obliged to hold dollar reserves, effectively financing the lender’s current account deficit. 
In response to this and other initiatives, there is significant emergent interest in promoting 
local currency aid and other commercial finance. At its most recent annual meetings, for 
example, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) floated the idea of converting its future 
assistance to local currency bond finance. This would achieve at least two objectives, 
transferring foreign exchange risk to the lender and promoting the development of local 
financial markets.  
While the objectives behind local or domestic currency finance seem quite 
laudable, they ignore a serious problem of moral hazard, one that actually does arise in 
the macro management context. Countries with substantial aid obligations of this type 
would suffer great temptation to mitigate these liabilities with inflationary policies. With 
this in mind, it might be advisable to develop a middle ground for aid finance, using a 
weighted basket of currencies to overcome both lender and borrower incentive problems. 
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Policy coherence in bilateral relationships 
 
The emergence of multilateral aid agencies has done much to remove historical 
biases in the aid allocation process, but bilateral assistance remains very important to 
poor countries. Because of their sustained commitments in this area, it is therefore 
particularly regrettable that donor countries often pursue economic policies that partially 
or completely contradict the principles of their assistance programs. We believe that the 
cause of aid effectiveness could be advanced dramatically if bilateral donors would 
simply improve their own policy coherence, better harmonizing their agendas for 
domestic economic management, trade policy, and development assistance. Two areas 
where this is particularly important are agriculture and tied aid. 
 
4.3 Richer farmers, poorer farmers: OECD agricultural support and global 
immiserization 
It is now well understood that domestic agricultural support programs in OECD 
countries represent a huge implicit tax on rural households in developing countries. 
Chronic upward trends in this assistance have sustained excess agricultural supply in rich 
countries, leading to long-term downward pressure in global food prices and the real 
incomes for farmers in unsubsidized, largely poor countries.  
Recent estimates (Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe 2002) 
indicate that current OECD farm programs reduce rural incomes in poor countries by $62 
billion annually. This figure is over 20% greater than even the most ambitious goals for 
increased development assistance presently under discussion. Moreover, these benefits 
would go directly to the poorest households in the developing world, conveniently 
bypassing bilateral and multilateral agencies, national, regional, and even local 
governments. Even more ironically, these estimates show that taxpayers in OECD 
countries essentially pay twice for every dollar of development assistance, once to reduce 
the incomes of the rural poor and once in an effort to offset this immiserization. 
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Clearly, the agricultural support and development assistance agendas arise in 
different policy contexts. However, it cannot be denied that they arise in the same 
governments and, thanks to general equilibrium effects, in the same global economy. For 
this reason, it is perhaps even more important to heed the initiative of the Doha trade 
round and improve the coherence between national farm agendas, global poverty 
alleviation, and open multilateralism. The Doha trade round does deserve to become a 
genuine development round where developing countries become actors, and where 
negotiated results reflect developing country interests. A major challenge to the 
international society is to ensure, in practice, that also the poorest countries are integrated 
in the global economy. Allowing narrow-minded domestic interests in developed 
countries to stand in the way for achieving this goal is, to put it plainly, hypocrisy. 
 
4.4 Tied aid, market reform, and the WTO 
Much development assistance in recent decades has been administered with a 
strong dose of free market ideology. Despite high-minded liberalism, however, donor 
countries often revert to anti-competitive practices that could be challenged in their own 
domestic jurisdictions and intra-OECD commercial agreements. The persistent use of 
sole-source expenditure or tied aid practices represents a post-colonial anachronism that 
contradicts the efficiency principles of both aid effectiveness and (domestic and external) 
market liberalization.  
From a general equilibrium perspective, tied aid constitutes not only a 
monopolistic practice. It is an anti-competitive export promotion technique. Indeed, it 
may only be a matter of time before the WTO hears a complaint about this practice, but 
would it not make more sense for bilateral actors to take the initiative and improve the 
coherence of their own policies in this context? 
 
4.5 Aid versus strategic assistance 
A number of bilaterals have been accused of misallocating development 
assistance in pursuit of strategic objectives, either because they are distorting the 
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definition of eligible activities or because beneficiary governments compromise their aid 
programs. While geopolitical aspirations are endemic to most national policies, it does 
little service to the cause of aid effectiveness to implicate military and other strategic 
assistance into aid budgets. For this reason, we would argue for a set of international 
standards about what constitutes bona fide development assistance. While it would be 
difficult to agree on a restrictive list of aid activities, agreement would be desirable at 
least with respect to a set of concrete objectives such as poverty alleviation or other 
international development goals. A more concerted multilateral approach like this could 
help reduce aid misallocation, arbitrage, and other problems such as fungibility and rent-
seeking. 
 
 
Micro perspectives: Contracts, incentives, and sustainable credit mechanisms 
 
In reality, and in spite of all the rhetoric of the aid community, aid and lending 
relationships involve complex contractual and agency relationships that are essentially 
microeconomic in nature. Even though the beneficiary signatories to aid agreements or 
contracts often have macroeconomic authority, they behave as microeconomic agents and 
their strategic environment is often partially in conflict with that of the donor/lender. 
Nowhere is this incentive paradox more apparent than in lending for development 
assistance.  
In this section, we discuss aspects of contract theory that may contribute to 
overcoming these incentive problems. In many cases, we place special emphasis on the 
idea of ownership, particularly localization of ownership. By this we do not mean 
abstract or rhetorical ideas of stake holding or community participation, but contractual 
ownership with its appurtenant real entitlements and responsibilities. Whether because of 
its paternalistic bilateral tradition or the bias of sovereign lending arrangements, the aid 
relationship has been relatively weak in recognition of ownership principles. We believe 
this has been detrimental to aid effectiveness for many reasons, not least of which 
because it has diluted accountability and promoted such practices as rent-seeking, 
fungibility, and aid arbitrage. 
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4.6 Decentralizing sovereign credit 
Bilaterals and particularly, multilaterals often find themselves in the dilemma of 
extending 15-30 years credit to governments that are clearly influenced by short-run (3-5 
year) policy priorities and needs. This reinforces the macro/heuristic rule biases discussed 
earlier. Sovereignty is obviously not negotiable, but there may be ways to restructure 
lending agreements that limit the uncertainty associated with political transition. The 
most attractive of these is decentralization, where contracts for loans and grants enlist 
agency at regional and local levels. Ideally, this would include both performance criteria 
and direct financial responsibility such as co-payment provisions. Most decentralization 
entails parallel conferral of local authority and, in the case of co-payment, might require 
new domestic entitlements.  
For example, an upland water retention scheme would be coupled with local 
water resale rights to finance co-payment. National and even regional governments might 
not be congenial to these statutory reforms, but provisions of this kind have two 
important virtues. They help overcome the primary aid incentive problem and improve 
domestic policy coherence, better aligning real entitlements with financial responsibility 
and performance. Lenders and donors might complain that regional and local 
governments are even more unpredictable than national ones. To this we would reply that 
credit- and need-worthiness should be assessed at the beneficiary level and, despite its 
relative convenience, national accountability often fails to meet this standard. Consider 
instead the most extreme form of decentralization, micro-credit, about which we have 
more to say next. The much-touted success of this approach is a direct result of the 
attributes we emphasize, local eligibility and accountability.  
 
4.7 Micro-credit reconsidered 
As was just mentioned, micro-credit can be viewed as one of the most extreme 
forms of aid decentralization, extending assistance and fiduciary responsibility directly to 
the microeconomic level. Moreover, we argue that the success this approach has enjoyed 
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is directly adducible to the microeconomic nature of the contract underlying this form of 
assistance. Individuals are the atomic unit for eligibility, evaluation, and financial 
accountability (as well as ownership), and this aligns incentives to produce superior 
performance characteristics. There are lessons in this experience for designing aid 
contracts at the local community, regional, and national levels. 
Having said this, the experience with micro-credit has not been uniformly 
positive. Indeed, recent experience in Bangladesh and a few other areas has revealed 
substandard loan portfolios and serious risks beyond recognized loan loss provisions. We 
believe these cases justify a reconsideration of the appropriate role and design of micro-
credit schemes. Like many forms of aid, micro-credit is best suited when designed to 
overcome market failure. The failure in question here is the local capital market, with the 
effect of credit rationing. In most applications of micro-credit programs, however, the 
remedy is two-fold, credit provision and interest rate mitigation. This creates a new 
source of policy risk. While credit is often rationed at the local level in developing 
countries, there is not much empirical evidence on what is or should be the real risk 
premium or market rate of return. For this reason, it may not make sense to assume – as 
often done – that local lending rates are too high. Thus, well-intentioned micro-credit 
schemes may over-allocate credit and accumulate loan losses at unsustainable rates. In 
this context, it is worth noting that non-performing loan rates are not by themselves a 
problem, it is the pricing of risk that is critical. A financial aid scheme that presumes to 
increase credit allocation and fix prices at the same time is assuming a great deal about 
the quality of its own expectations. We believe that micro-credit policies should be 
refocused on facilitating market-based financial intermediation, as is currently being done 
by promoting commercial bank participation in the remittance market.12 
 
4.8 Grants versus negative interest rates 
There has been much discussion recently about increasing the grant proportion of 
development assistance, both in terms of converting future aid from loans to grants and to 
                                                 
12 IDB (2001) provides details on this. 
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forgive outstanding loans. While loan forgiveness has many advocates, particularly on 
behalf of the poorest and most (per capita or per dollar of GDP) indebted countries, there 
is a significant and influential opposition to large-scale loan-to-grant conversion. The 
main objection here is that development assistance funds represent a kind of global 
commons, or community credit pool that should be managed on a renewable basis.  
We instinctively side with the opponents of large-scale conversion, sharing their 
reasons about sustainability of assistance, but feel that both sides in this debate are 
ignoring behavioral fundamentals. As long as we maintain an artificial dichotomy 
between grant and loan aid, there will be significant inefficiencies in global aid 
allocation. A better long term approach would be a comprehensive and relatively 
standard set of guidelines for concessional assistance, supported by a continuous 
spectrum of assistance plans ranging from outright grants to commercially rated credit. 
This can best be achieved by standardized aid contracts that stipulate interest rates 
varying from -100% (that is pure grant aid directed to those with no repayment ability 
whatsoever) to LIBOR plus some commercial margin. Negative interest rates are an 
obvious efficiency refinement of the concept of concessional credit, while contract 
standardization would help to harmonize public and private credit instruments and, 
eventually, facilitate interaction between the two (as will be discussed next). Moreover, 
such transparency might actually help clarify the respective roles of different donors. In 
practice, their operations often overlap in ways that are seldom easy to relate to the 
underlying differences in aid and lending instruments and conditions. 
4.9 Public goods in poor countries, a more emphatic case for grants 
The idea of continuous aid pricing (positive and negative interest rates) can easily 
be defended on efficiency grounds, but in itself provides no guidance about what kind of 
projects should qualify for which interest rates. To close this list of ideas for more 
effective aid allocation, we want to highlight the argument for public goods in very poor 
countries. In this situation, we believe that outright grants clearly dominate subsidies.  
Consider the diagram below, with aggregate private goods measured on the 
vertical axis and aggregate public goods on the horizontal axis. Most empirical evidence 
suggests that social preferences for the two types of goods are related to average per 
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capita income, where low income groups strongly prefer (essential) private goods and 
higher income groups have more balanced preferences. In such a situation, subsidizing 
public goods (budget line A’C) will be more beneficial to the wealthy (UW), while grants 
(budget line A’B) will be more beneficial to the poor (UP2). If the objective of aid is 
income progressive (such as poverty alleviation) grant support of public goods provision 
would appear to be more appropriate. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Grants versus Subsidies 
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4.10 Privatization contingency and aid contracts 
It is well known from game theory that principal-agent relationships, such as 
those between lenders and borrowers, require contingent contracts to overcome moral 
hazard arising from incomplete information. We have already discussed the information 
problems endemic to aid relations in several contexts and, despite wide recognition of 
these; contingencies in aid loans are still relatively simplistic. Generally speaking, these 
confine themselves to mutual exclusion and renegotiation clauses, and offer little 
recourse to the already imperfect bilateral relationship between lender and borrower. 
As a partial, even an experimental step toward more efficient aid contracts, we 
would like to propose a privatization contingency. In particular, a clause of this kind 
would stipulate that, in previously agreed circumstances of nonperformance, part or all of 
the outstanding loan would automatically be resold into the commercial credit market.13 
Clearly, this could induce significant short-term write-downs for public lenders, but long-
term real renegotiation and rescheduling costs can be quite high. More importantly, 
however, partial remarketing could have a very tonic capital market discipline effect, 
attenuating both (lender) loan loss and (borrower) liability accumulation and reducing the 
likelihood of boom and bust credit cycles. 
 
 
5 Nongovernmental Organizations and “Cohabitation” 
 
Beneath the veneer of official facilitating agreements and institutions, globalization 
is largely about the proliferation of multilateral private agency. This is represented not 
only by international private commerce, via trade and financial linkages, but also in the 
rapid emergence and extension of Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs). While this 
discussion applies only to a subset of NGOs, a significant proportion of these institutions 
have arisen to meet manifest desires on the part of (mainly OECD) higher income 
individuals to participate, directly or indirectly, in the design and conduct of global 
                                                 
13 There is a clear role here for monitoring by independent assessors as discussed by Helleiner (2000). See 
also Section 5 below. 
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assistance activities, most of which are relevant to economic development. Seen in this 
way, the emergence of NGOs has pervasive implications for the pursuit of development 
assistance. To put it more bluntly, the NGO movement is a force and not only must, but 
should, be reckoned with by established bilateral and multilateral aid institutions.  
For this reckoning to be a constructive and beneficial experience, the principles of 
complementarity need to be recognized by all parties. For aid agencies, the question is 
again one of appropriate division of labor and strategic leverage. What can NGOs 
accomplish in the stead of public agencies, and how best can their intentions and energies 
be leveraged, both in pursuit of bona fide development objectives. To meet this 
challenge, and especially to do it with a minimum of politicization, is not easy, but it 
must be met if the full promise of North-South cooperation is ever to be realized. 
Given the differences in jurisdiction and policy accountability between public aid 
agencies and NGOs, there are substantial limits to joint activities, but this should not rule 
out, at minimum, real commitments to improved communication, coordination, and case-
by-case collaboration. In particular, we would like to encourage examination of more 
coordinated effort in three areas. 
1. Coordinated and regular consultation in the formulation and discussion of global 
development priorities, including joint public dialogue, research, and dissemination. 
Standards for participation in activities of this kind would obviously be subject to public 
agency authority and careful negotiation. We believe that democratic voices within the 
NGO movement need to be elevated from the sidewalk to more constructive venues for 
policy dialogue, but only on a basis qualified by their constituency. 
2. Collaboration and secondment to official aid activities. Over the last few decades, 
NGOs have demonstrated remarkable commitment and resourcefulness in areas where 
human needs are most acute. Just as we have argued that public aid agencies should be 
refocusing their activities on the most essential development priorities, the expertise, 
resources, and tenacity of NGOs offers valuable opportunities for collaboration at the 
operational level. The World Bank, for example, now finds itself to be the largest 
financier in the war against HIV/AIDS, while NGOs such as Medecins sans Frontieres 
have developed a well recognized capacity to deliver primary and urgent health care in 
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the epicenters of this public health crisis. Some bilaterals have already made much 
progress in this kind of collaboration, but it would be desirable to extend these lessons to 
a broader agenda of development policy and priorities. 
3. Assessment, auditing, and evaluation. There has been an animated discussion of 
aid review and performance accountability in recent years, particularly with reference to 
the World Bank. The most stubborn aspect of this debate is neither standards nor, 
ultimately, the results so far. What most polarizes the debate in this area is the question of 
independence.  
Even as private sector auditing standards are being re-examined in the OECD 
countries, the World Bank and many other public aid agencies are operating with 
evaluation models that ignore minimum standards of objectivity and independence. 
Performance auditing with internal staff, who are obliged to review offices and people 
who may some day have authority over them, has been discredited by most authoritative 
observers. The insistence on this approach is a regrettable kind of institutional denial, 
merely postponing an inevitable acceptance of more ethically defensible standards and a 
very (economically and perhaps politically) costly re-appraisal later on.  
When the time does come for more objective program evaluation, not only 
independent auditors (firms and individuals) and NGOs have a vast well of experience to 
draw upon. The fact that some NGOs are less than congenial to the institutions in 
question may actually be advantageous, since this will stimulate diversity of thinking in 
review and, ultimately, formulation. What is needed is responsible orchestration of these 
independent and partially discordant voices, meaning that review of this kind is best done 
collectively, perhaps with anonymity.  
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6 Conclusions 
 
This paper was originally motivated by informal discussions about how changes 
in the global economy have influenced the development process and, inevitably, must 
influence the strategies of those who seek to facilitate development. A searching 
examination of the literature on historical aid practices has revealed many insights about 
what has been accomplished. Aid did promote growth, but aid could have been made 
more effective. The second section of this paper gave an overview of these issues.  
Rather than dwelling upon aid effectiveness in retrospect, however, we have 
sought to use the lessons of the past and embed them in a vision of a rapidly changing 
global economy. In that context, we observed that the relative significance of public 
development assistance is much smaller than in the past and it is likely to continue 
shrinking. At the same time, there are important new agents on the international scene 
that affect the developing world’s prospects. To be effective as a smaller player in this 
new environment, we have argued that aid agencies must sharpen their implementation 
skills, focus on core priorities, and develop new strategic capacity for complementary 
relationships with, among others, private capital markets and NGOs. 
It should be noted that the ideas presented here are part of a work in progress. We 
are relatively agnostic about the political implications of our analysis and 
recommendations, striving foremost for intellectual honesty and objectivity. Having said 
this, a few salient aspects of this work seem worthy of emphasis. Firstly, we have noted a 
tendency in the aid effectiveness literature, and by extension in aid policy, toward 
excessive preoccupation with macro performance criteria and outcomes. While the 
correlation of these with material living standards in developing countries is an 
interesting empirical question, poverty and its attendant experiences are microeconomic 
phenomena. For this reason alone, we believe that most aid research and resources should 
be focused at this level. Moreover, we argue repeatedly that more attention to the 
microeconomic properties of development aid will improve its effectiveness. In this 
context, another important issue we emphasize is the decentralization of economic 
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accountability, including ownership in the literal sense of contractual entitlement and 
responsibility down to the local level. We believe this more concrete approach to 
ownership will significantly improve the incentive characteristics of development 
assistance.   
In order to stimulate discussion and a renewal of thinking in this area, we have put 
forward a set of ten percepts for design and implementation of development assistance. In 
addition to what has already been mentioned, we suggest that bilateral donors make 
greater effort to achieve policy coherence, reconciling or at least clarifying many policies 
that are be in partial or direct conflict with generally accepted principles of development 
aid. These include, among other things, domestic agricultural support, tied aid, and 
strategic assistance.  
At the microeconomic level, we advocate a more flexible approach to the 
grant/loan dichotomy, more generous granting for public goods provision in the poorest 
countries and, finally, a privatization contingency in development lending agreements. 
This last idea might seem controversial, but we believe it to be a vital step in reforming 
the lending relationship and, more profoundly, an essential example of the 
complementarity we advocate throughout this paper, linking development assistance 
directly with emergent private capital markets. If the ideas presented here are allowed to 
evolve in the aid policy environment, we expect to see more robust and dynamic linkages 
between public and private finance in the developing world. Aid agreements with better 
private incentive (ownership) characteristics, coupled with the tonic influence of private 
capital market discipline, may bring us closer to the dual goals of social and economic 
efficiency. If this happens both the developing and the developed world will be 
beneficiaries.  
 33
 
7 References 
 
Beghin, John, David Roland-Holst, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe. 2002. “Global 
Agricultural Trade and the Doha Round: What are the Stakes for North and South?” 
Paper presented at the OECD - World Bank Forum on Agricultural Trade Reform, 
Adjustment, and Poverty, May 23-24, Paris, and at the Fifth Conference on Global 
Economic Analysis, June 5-7, Taipei. 
 
Boone, Peter. 1996. “Politics and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid.” European 
Economics Review.40 (2): 289-329 
 
Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 1997. “Aid, Policies and Growth.” Policy Research 
Working Paper 1777. World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington, 
D.C. 
 
Burnside, Craig and David Dollar. 2000. “Aid, Policies and Growth.” American 
Economic Review 90 (4): 847-68. 
 
Collier, Paul. 2002. “Making Aid Smart: Institutional Incentives facing Donor 
Organizations and their Implications for Aid Effectiveness.” Paper presented at the 
USAID Forum Series on the Role of Institutions in Promoting Growth, February 
25, Washington, D.C. 
 
Dalgaard, Carl-Johan, Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. 2002. “On the Empirics of Foreign 
Aid and Growth.” Centre for Research in Economic Development and International 
Trade (CREDIT) Working Paper 02/08. University of Nottingham. 
 
Devarajan, Shantayanan, David Dollar, and Torgny Holmgren (eds.). 2001. Aid and 
Reform in Africa. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
 
Hansen, Henrik and Finn Tarp. 2000. “Aid Effectiveness Disputed.” Journal of 
International Development Vol. 12 (3): 375-98. 
 
Hansen, Henrik and Finn Tarp. 2001. “Aid and Growth Regressions.” Journal of 
Development Economics Vol. 64 (2): 547-70. 
 
Helleiner, Gerry. 2000. “Towards Balance in Aid Relationships: Donor Performance 
Monitoring in Low-Income Countries.” Cooperation South Journal, No. 2: 21-35. 
 
IDB. 2001. “Remittances as a Development Tool: A regional conference.” Proceedings, 
of the Inter-American Development Bank, May 17-18, Washington, D.C. 
 
Mosley, Paul. 1987. Overseas Aid: Its Defence and Reform. Brighton: Wheatsheaf 
Books. 
 34
 
Mosley, Paul and John Hudson. 2001. “Aid, Poverty reduction and the ‘New 
Conditionality’”. Mimeo. University of Sheffield. 
 
Solow, Robert. 2001. “Applying Growth Theory across Countries.” World Bank 
Economic Review Vol. 15 (2): 283-88. 
 
Tarp, Finn (ed.). 2000. Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for 
the Future. London & New York: Routledge. 
 
Tarp, Finn. 2001. “Book review: Aid and Reform in Africa”. Journal of African 
Economies Vol. 10: 341-53. 
 
World Bank. 1998. Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t and Why. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
World Bank. 2002. The Role and Effectiveness of Development Assistance: Lessons from 
World Bank Experience. A Research Paper from the Development Economics Vice 
Presidency of the World Bank. Washington, D.C. 
